PREFACE
For at least the last five centuries of recorded' history, Southeast Asians have been conspicuously divided into peoples of the hills and of the plains. Hjghlanders have tended to be independent animists living in small communities isolated by war or terrain, ·without developed systems of either kinship or peonage and ordering their lives according to custom and oral tradition . . Their lowland . neighbors, exposed to the greater traditions of Buddhism, Islam or Christianity, lived in more complex worlds with courts and chronicles, plazas and cathedrals. They made obeisance and paid tribute to devarajahs, sultans or governors-general Southeast Asians of the plains stereotyped the mountain people . as primitive, hostile and · naive. Hill tribesmen considered lowlanders arrogant, weak and deceitful. Though trade patterns produced varying degrees of economic symbiosis, mutual antipathy between highlander and lowlander was the norm.
Western colonial authority intruded into this Southeast Asian world and virtually without exception (and, indeed, virtually without regard for geographical, cultural or temporal limits) developed relations with highland peoples that were largely congenial, in contrast to·the inimical colonial relationships with lowland cultures. Low. buid, national heroes in Southeast Asia are those of the resis-. tarice to colonial authority-the Bonifacios, Sukarnos and Ho Chi Minns. The highland minorities treasure positive. communal recollections of this same foreign presence. Westerners have been admitted to the popular pantheon of folk heroes among such disparate groups as the Ifugaos of Luzon, the Kachin of Burma, the Rhade of Vietnam and the Semang of Malaysia. Around the evening fires old men of KaJinga tell tales of the courageous warrior and great judge Sapao (Walter F. Hale). The Shan spin similar stories of Shway Yoe (Sir James George Scott).
•
The purpose of this stud·y is to aamine the Philippine experience, the fascinating but hitherto . untold story of interaction . . between the American colonial authorities and the independent, headhunting, terrace-building people of Luzon's Gran Cordillera Central. The picture which emerges is drawn as muc.h as possible fron1 accounts of the participants themselves, a ''people's eye view'' of history. It focuses primarily on . the province of Ifugao, for the American presence there was lQngest and best-remembered. Despite the great cultural differences between turn-of-the-century Ifugaos and Americans, the oral accounts· which make up this story porµ-ay for us an intriguing relationship-a mutually satisfactory symbiosis due in large measure to an unexpected congruence of important cultural values.
· Both the Ifugaos and the American aposl held personal courage and fighting ability in the highest regard. Battles between them often ended with the words ''We had a good fight.'' The American concept of ''playing fair and square'' resulted in a simple, common sense system of justice comprehensible to the Ifugaos. The white apos made deliberate use of Ifugao magical/ spiritual elements to reinforce their authority. On feast days, Ifugao· warriors were chal-.
lenged . to publicly demonstrate the protective powers of their hiwang : (tali~,n). When a rifle . slug shattered the charm, the superior spiritu~ power of the apo was effectively demonstrated. for all to se~. Even the relationships which developed between the American apos and Ifugao women mirrored traditional Ifugao behavioral patterns and proved to be agreeable to both parties.
Where American p~licy decreed change in lfugao customs, the white apos attempted to utilize existing indigenous systems to •
IX

Chapter I
SETTING THE STAGE
Geographical Features
The Gran Cordillera Central, the most prominent geographical feature of northern Luzon, rise~· abruptly from the fertile central plain of Luzon some 200 kilometers above Manila and continues northward for another 250 kilometers before falling away to the sea. Tl)e Cordillera >s average elevation varies from 1000 to 1500 meters while its highest peaks stretch upward some 3000 meters. The mountain chain forms a rugged barrier between the narrow coastal plain of Ilocos on t~e west and the broad · valley of· the Cagayan River on the east, and provides a homeland for six major highland groups known collectively as Igorotsl but _separately · and more properly as the Ibaloi, Ka~kanay, Ifugao, Bon~oc, Kalinga and Apayao (or Isneg). , The Ifugao culture-area is located in an eastern and southern region of the Gran Cordillera Central. To the west the Mt. Dat.a range separates the lfugaos from the Kankanays of Benguet and ·on the north and west the province is bounded by Mt. Polis, Mt. Amuyao and the Bontoc-people. On the south and southeast Ifugao is insulated from the plains of Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela by a sparsely populated, malaria-ridden zone of · grass-covered, rolling hills. With the exception of the 200-~ectare2 Lagawe plateau the terrain consists of precipitous mountains cut by short, sw~t tributaries of the Cagayan River. The mountain slopes are covered wjth dense tropical forest or, p~icularly in the drier eastern regions, by thick, knife-edged cogon grass. · Cultural Background .The most populous of the six cqlture-groups inhabiting the Cordillera, the Ifugaos (from lpugao, meaning mortals or ''people on earth',) are particularly noted for extensive, well-irrigated rice terrace systems which often extend up the mountainsides for 500 meters or more. Lengthy irrigation canals are frequently cut into the steep · slopes to bring water to the t~rraces from mountain springs several kilometers away, en route crossing vertical cliffs or deep canyons in troughs made from hollowed tree trunks. The nearly perpendicular walls of the terraces are constructed of stones fitted together without mortar and commonly exceed five meters in height. The te~ain on which the terraces are built is so precipitous that the height of the wall often exceeds the width of the rice field produced by building it.
Unlike other mountain peoples, who often plant two crops of
• rice each year, the Ifugaos traditionally plant only one. The rice produced is large-grained and of excellent quality, but the limitation of one planting per year means that only the wealthiest lfugaos are able to eat rice (the preferred food) year round. The staple for mo' st Ifugaos is the camote (sweet potato) grown in catngins (swiddens) slashed and burned onto the slopes surrounding every lfugao settlement. The. diet is supplemented by products of hunting (chiefly wild boar and deer) and gath~ring in nearby forests.
. .
Chic:kens, pigs and occasionally carabaos are domesticated and raised by the Ifugaos but these animals are kept for sacrifice to the anitos (ancestral spirits) and are rarely,·if ever, killed just for food. The .lfugaos, like the other highland groups of northern Luzon, are by tradition animists and believe that all matter has both corporeal and incorporeal existence. . The complex Ifugao cosmology includes a bewildering variety of spirit·beings, good and evil, who are assumed to be involved to varying degrees in the affairs of human. beings. As a means of propitiating the anitos animals are: sacrificed at cafiaos (spirit-feasts)!' The spirit-beings devour the soul . . . of the animal and leave the flesh for the human celebrants, a cir:-cumstance which often provides the poorer lfugaos with their only , opportuni~y to eat meat.
Providing such . opportunities was one method by which the most influential Ifugaos maintained their status in traditional Ifugao ~ociety. A~ong the lfugaos there existed an upper class of notables (kadangyan), a rank most often based on wealth, but one which was also accessible through demonstration of valor in battle or oratori-, cal ability and wise counsel. Kadangyan status provided its holders with the right of consultation on matters (?f community concern and varying degrees of -moral authority over those . of lower social standing, . but a kadangyan's influence had limitations. Friar Juan Villaverde, the best Spanish. chronicler of the Ifugaos, noted in the late 1800's. that:
... the lfugaos have no king,' nor ruler. They pay tribute to no one. Each is the absolute monarch of his house and person, and although this individual liberty is one of the principal causes of their miserable and almost anarchical state, it is certain that it is one of their most dominant passions.a . These independent Ifugaos c~stomarily lived in hundreds of small settlements (called rancherias by Spaniards and. Americans) which typically consisted, not of compact villages, but of scattered hamlets (sitios) of a few houses each. rh. ere were no public buildings, and ~ settlement of fewer than 1000 people might_ well be spread across 500 or 6. 00 vertical meters of terrace sy_ stem and extend along a river valley-for several kilometers. Traditio~al garb for the .men was the wanoh, a loin-cloth popularly referred to as a g-string, and women wore the tapis~ a short skirt which ended above the knees. Both garments were made by women, originally from pounded sheets of tree bark. By the 1800's : they. were commonly made · of cloth woven on Ifugao back-looms using. thread _ obtained by trade with the lowlands. The men did basketry and woodcarving while certain rancherias, especially Hapao, were known for expert metalworkers who pro. duced tools and. accessories of war such as spearheads and double-edged fighting bolos.
The Ifugaos, like the . other mountain tribes, .were inveterate headhunters. Valor., more than oratorical ability or even wealth, was the . badge of leadership among the lfugaos, and lfugaos enthusiastically sought the honor which a~crued to the taker of human heads. Raiding w~ the norm . .. Small bands of six or eight men stealthily slipped into enemy .territory, waite<:I · in ambush for passers-by .or work~rs in the fields, $peared and beheaded their victims, and then raced for the safety of home territory ·before the alarm could be given, With · . head-taking the ideal and blood~vengeance for such losses a requirement, a perpetual .state of fe\ld existed in Ifugao until the American imposition of an external orde~ in the first decade of.the t'Yentieth century. Though ad hoc alliances· were occasionally formed, · lfugao rancherias were -independent and recognized .nQ suzerain. Friendly relatioQs might exist between . settlements in close proximity to one another, bu. tin mo: st cases to leave the ~mediate vicinity of one's ·ranch· eria was to court · decapitation.. The danger of travel, the · difficulty of the terrain and the essential self-sufficiency of each community resulted, as years passed, in a pattern of introversion characterized by a parochial i~entification with the home village (perceived as an extended kin-group), a general suspicion of . non-kin, significant dialect differences and political independence. 4 The Spanish Experience
The lfugao way of life continued undisturbed by Spanish in~ur-sions for almost two centuries after Miguel Lopez de Legaspi began the conquest of the Philippines for Spain. It · was not until the 1750's that Spanish tr. oops first fought their way into the Kiangan region of southern Ifugao in response to headhunting raids against Spain's ~ilipino5 subjects · living in the Cagayan Valley. Continued Ifugao · sorties of this ·nature made it impossible for Spanish authorities to ignore the Ifugaos and punittve expeditions were ordered into the ·mountains. For the ne.x t century and a half both church and state· gave varying degrees of attention to ~the difficult task of catechizing and conttolling these independent pagans . in what proved to be an unsucce~sful ·effort to bring the Ifugaos·into a state of Christian . subjection similar to that imposed upon their lowland brothers.
. Spanish policies .to attain these ends vacillated between persuasion and punishment throughout the.history of Spanish-Ifugao contact, but from the number of priests killed and military eKpeditions launched. it ·was · . clear that neither method was very effective in convincing the Ifugaos to· accept either taxation or baptism. Several e.xpeditions were .launched against southern lfugao beginning in the 1750's. They met with · strong·resistance and one sent in 1193 was soundly beaten and forced to retreat to the lowlands.
In 1so· 1 Friar Juan Molano entered Kiangan alone, the first missionary to reach that place without the company of a military force. He was impressed by the industry evident in the terraced fields and excellent · houses; and· was pennitted to wander about observing· daily life· . ·Molano broached the . possibility · of staying permanently in Kiangan but the idea was firmly rejected. The lfugaos told. him that they were ·willing to be friends and have him , visit for· a few days at a time, but that a full-time .priest would not be permitted. N· evertheless, Molano apparently ' .felt· ,encouraged by the ·1fugaos' lack of animosity and 'wrote to-·. a co -worker. ex.pressing . his opinion that it might not be very difficult to begin mission work in Kiangan.6 · Such beginnings were still half a century away, for the following year Spanish· expeditions were again fighting the Ifugaos. In 1802 troops were sent against Mayoyao and in 1810 Kiangan was fi~rcely opposing more Spanish expeditions. Guillermo Galvey,: named
Coman~nte General de /garrotes, made repeated efforts to conquer lgorots living in various regions · of the Cordillera, and in 1832 fought his way into Kiangan. He spent two. days destroying 18 sitios and their neighboring fields and in his report on the expedi·tion explained Spanish intentions · and the steps he felt. would be necessary to achieve them:
I am persuaded that if two or three· expeditions like this are made every year in May [i.e. just before harvest] to destroy their crops, the lgorots will have to· g~ve way. , ·pay tribute and, above ·a11, leave· the Christian towns· in peace, who don't dare go 100 steps from · their . homes for fear of losing their head$ ... 7
Whether such tactics would have had the effect Galvey anti-
• cipated was problematical for · other lgorots had abandoned their terraces· and moved farther into · the mountains in the ·face of such devastation, preferrring camotes and independence_ to rice and subjugation. In any event the question remains speculative since · the Spanish gov~rnment, whether· for economic · or policy reasons, did not field the forces necessary to carry out Galvey's proposed conquest. Ifugao raids on the lowlands continued, at least partly because· , in the absence of lfugao overlords~ with wide-ranging · authority, the burning of Kiangan 's houses and fields had no effect on other rancherias'· ··participation in Christian head-taking. Ten ,..
They· have· immense fields of rice, but despite the fact that they live comf or.tably off the · fruits of their labor, they . take ·a horrible pleasure in lying in wait to murder travellers and, without.robbing . them, cut· off their heads, sip their brains· , and adorri the interior of their ·houses with human skulls, copsidering those who possess these dreadful trophies the mo.st · important ... .. Because of these barbarians, travellers passing .from 'Nueva Vizcaya to Cagayan ·have to join· . in groups of 60 to 80 and take an escort .. . ; · .8 In 184 7, principally because-of continued Ifugao depredations in th~ lowlands, Military Governor Mariano· Oscariz of Nueva Vizcaya marched for Mayoyao with a large, well-armed force, destroying everything~ in · his path-houses, crops, terraces and irrigation systemsr Six days later he planted his flag in M~yoyao and offered the lfugaos a choice between capitulation and total destruction. The Mayoyaos gave in to Osca:riz .and agreed to pay tribute in rice as a token of their surrehder to Spanish rule. Forty hostages were taken to the lowlands to en~ure continued compliance and in 1849 a delegation of prominent Mayoyaos was taken to Malacaiiang where they offered persol)al submission to the Governor-General. In , Mayoyao itself the. Ifugaos offered their assistance to·the Spanish on raids aga~st other independent ranch~ias and also re<tuested . that a priest be-sent to live with them. Spanjsh· officials and clergy 'Yere delighted with this apparent pag~ri interest in Chri.$t's · ~ch- Our r~gion is far from any of these · posts. and the only time we · fel~ the hand of the Spaniards was when our · enemies were able to enlist their aid against us in retaliation • for our head-hunting and slave-catching. Then a detachment of Spaniards, accompanied by warriors from the off ended village or region, would come . down on us suddenly and burn· houses anc;l catch pigs and perhaps kill a-few people who were slQw in taking to the forest. The Ifugaos accom-· panying the expedition would behead the slain and cut off their hands and feet as , well. They never burned our villages in Bitu, but they burned villages in the neighboring region , of Hingyon, ·and our kin there took refuge with us until th~y could rebuild their houses.12
While some rancherias were thus shielded by distance, others were placed in dire straits when their neighbors became hosts of a Spanish garrison. The Spanish tended to pay·little or no attention to the complaints of other distrJots against the Ifugaos of Kiangan • and as a result · many debts went uncollected as the Kiangans took advantage of Spanish protection to evade payment. Nagacaran was located only five kilometers from Kiangan and was linked to it
• through ties of marriage and blood but developed bitter hatred for the Spanish and for the Kiangans whom the Nagacarans accused of inviting them. When the Kiangans refused to honor their debts the Nagacarans began to .take heads 'in retaliation. The Kiangans complained to the Spanish comma~der about their vicious neighbors, · .
presumably . without explaining the true genesis of the ac· ts, and he agreed that the . Nagacararis · should be punished. The first ·Spanisb force sent to retaliate was am bushed and annihilated· by the Naga-. carans, only· five of 40 soldiers reportedly making it back to Kiangan. A larger expedition followed, burned Nagacaran. to the ground, killed a number of people, and SJ?arked c;,ne of the longestlasting · enmities ·in lfugao.13 " . .. lfugaos of the garrison towns also appear to have enlisted Spanish assistance in raids against their own enemies and this alliance seems to have persuaded at least one victimized. region to band · together . for the purpose of retaliation asainst ho. th the Spanish troops and the Ifugao rancheria. which .persuaded the soldiers to fight their battles; In escalation of an older Centr-1 Ifugao rivalry, , Banaue and its civil guard post was attacked by an allied force from downstream rancherias headed by. Kababuyan. Bugan of Hingyon related the following story. of ·that fight: :
At about this time there was a great expedition otf all the regions along our tributary · against Benawol. · My brother Aduri.glay went along. The expeditio.n ended disastrously beeau~ the men disregarded bad omens along .the way. Abo1;1t a hundred people were killed by the Benawol-folk.
After that the Spaniards came with the Benawol people and ·burned villages in Kababuyan, Mampolya and Hingyon. They w. ent first to Mampolya; the folk there fled to · the mountains, but didn't have time to take ·nearly all their pigs and chickens with them. The Spaniards and their Benawol .allies burned the villages, sparing o~y the one: where they · stayed overnight. That night, Pangel and some companions slipped· into the outskirts of the village and killed a Spaniard and took his head ... The Spaniards went back to Benawol, but they came back and made a surprise a~tack on Hingyon. My brother Adunglay and other Hingyon men killed two Benawol men. The Spaniards carried . away· many pigs, chickens, . valuable gongs · and jars, and burned many villages ... 14 Even the garrison towns which pragmatically allied themselves with the Spanish did not escape Spanish occupation unscathed. Though they gained security from the soldiers' presence and· increased their chances-of success in head-raiding by having Spanish allies~ they were subject to payment of tribute. In addition, mem-. ories survive throughout Ifugao of the maltreatment of lfugaos by Spanish'· and lowland. soldiers, and this type of oppression seems to have been at least as common in garrison towns as in outlying rancherias. A strongly · · worded protest sent by the Kiangan priest Juan Villaverde to the · Kiangan troop commander Juan de la Plaza in 1896 supports the Ifugao recollections. The · troops, Villaverde complains in his letter, are: daily in one village ot another, demanding. or taking palay [.rice] , pigs or chic kens as they wish, and carrying these things off whether their owners like · it · or not, throwing them a nalf-peso piece, for · example, for something ·worth two or more pesos; ~d if any of them try ·to def end their property . rights, . they ru~ ~he immediate risk of being ·shot and killed, as seems to have happened not so long ago in the village of Anao where they killed an Igorot for a matter of one hen he tried to prevent. their taking ... And this taking palay or whatever by these means and by· force sometimea causes .us casualties ·as happened in Hapao not along qo when an Igorot apparently lost his head during an argument over palay and killed a soldier .15
These abuses, r.ecorded in Villaverde's letter and in oral accounts by Ifugaos, highlight the contrast between Spaniah practices on the Cordillera and the more sympathetic ltate11aents of . colonial policy issued in Manila. The docum~nts pro· Yided the Igorots· with .. considerably more · humanitarian treatment than they actually received. In one instance, even the fact of Ifugao independence anq the likelihood of opposition to Spanish subjugation was viewed with remarkable tolerance by Governor-General Weyler in his 1889 letter of instructions to the commandant in Kiangan:
The Politico-Military Commandant must remember that he will be exercising his authority over pagans who do not know the benefits of good government and who, even when they do know it, may in many cases prefer the savage. independence in which they have lived and have seen their ancestors live.16
Weyler's further injunctions presaged in· several ways the policies which would be adopted by the Americans on the Cordillera. The Kiangan commander was advised to impose his authority lightly, not rigorou. sly, and to establish schools and open roads since Weyler believed that, asid. e from religion, nothing subdued savages faster than open communications. Labor, though forced and· un~ paid, was to be used in the seasons most convenient for the Ifugaos, the dignity of their leaders was to be demonstrated by deference and rewards, inter-village disputes were to be settled with complete justice and good morals, and the highlanders were to be protected against abuses by lowlanders or even Christian officials. As the Americans were to· discover, such ameliorative measures did help to win Ifugao cooperation. Unfortunately, the Spanish not only failed to carry them out, but also included a~· ong these .beneficial proposals unpopular policies of taxation, relocation and Christianization which undid any good will which might otherwise have . accrued to the government. Weyler enjoined the ·Kiangan commander to ''cooperate fully with the missionary· fathers; regroup [the Ifugaos] into settlements little by little .. ·. [and] collect some token of vassalage or dependence. ''17 · From the beginning of the Spanish effort to conquer the lfugaos these three policies ' had provoked the greatest resistance, but after 140 years of failure Weyler was still advocating them. They continued to · be unpalatable t;o the lfugaos and contributed to the enthusiasm with which the lfugaos expelled the last Spanish forces in 1897.
· When the Philippine Rev. olution broke out in 1896 a number of troops assigned to Ifugao and other places on the · Cordillera were withdraw· n in order to assist in the battles against Filipino revolu-. tionaries in the provinces surrounding Manila. · Licyayu, a . headman of Banaue, recalled the soldiers' departure from the post in Banaue because of an event illustrative of the relations between the civil guards stationed there and the Banaue people. The garrison slaughtered its cattle in order to take the meat along. They left only ·the heads and legs, but when the Banaue people approached intending to salvage even these few remains, the soldiers threw rocks at them, driving them away. The detachment withdrew to Kiangan without being attacked, but the Banaue lfugaos were haPRY to see them. leave.18
The soldiers who did remain in lfugao after the withdrawal of the outlying garrisons were· soon in per~ as word spread that other people were also fighting the Spanish. For the garrisons remaining in Kiangan and Payawan · (on the Nueva Vizcaya border) the end came on a Sunday. While the troops were kneeling at mass · the Ifugaos fell on them and massacred them all. In general, however, the 150-year effort to bring the lfugaos un. der Spanish dominjon has to be considered a failure. After much ef fart the province had b~en pe~etrated militarily b~ t Ifugao r~sis-tance to Spanish sovereignty w-as n~ver overcome. With the help of the Ifugao warriors in garrison towns the Spanish were able to exert pressure on nearby ranch_ erias and obtain irregular payment$. of tribute or lfugao services for trail construction, but the Spanis~ presence in lfugao was µever mor~ th~ a tenuous military occupation of the highlands by lqwlanq-based soldiers. Dark memories of tha cruelty and oppression of t~· e period remain strong 80 ye.ars or • more after the events transpired._ In th~ long run, however, the most damaging heritage of this era was lfl:lgao bitterness toward lowland Filipinos .. While som~ of this feeling is dou.btless at. tributable to a common Southeast Asian, and perhaps wprldwide, ~tipathy between . mountaineer and · plainsman, the abuses perpetrated against the lfugaos by Filipino troops of the Spanish gurisons created · an enmity which is strong even today. · .
· With · the elhnina~ion of ~e Spanish garrison$ head-hunting flared up across Ifugao since old scores could once more be settled ~ithout the interference of outside forces. Banaue was again attacked by a war party from several Kababuyan rancherias in what was probably the biggest single battle in lfugao b~f ore World War II. Though · Banaue won, losses on both sides were sobering. Most reliable reports estimate 200 heaqs were lost. In another chapter of the Kiangan-Nagacaran feud, the Nagacar3:ns attacked Kiangan vowing to take Kiangan h~ds and burn the deserted (but presumably symbolic) convento. Rafael Bulayungan led . _ the Kiangan defense and won himself a great reputation for . bravery by inflicting heavy casualties and driving off the Nagacarans with the aid of rifles captured from the Spanish.22 . In fact, the period· between. the de~eat of the ·_ Spanish and the imposition of A~erican authority involved some of the most intense warfare in Ifugao history. Dr. Dayid Barrows, an early Americ~n explorer qf Ifugao,' described .graphically the tumultU:oqs conditions which confronted th~ first Am. ericans to visit the lfugaos. He reported from Kiangan th.at ''feud is raging everywhere since the withdrawal of the Sp~nish garrisons .. People do not dare go beyo:s;id theit immediate circle of towns and -work in the fields with . their spears. ''23 . In the mountains of lfugaq both the Spanish and the Americans faced the Qifficult task of imposing the~ authority upon inde. pendent and defiant Ifugao warriors. The.Ifugaos in each case .were confrc;>nt~ with white-~kinned outsiders who. arrogated ~o themselves the right to redirect Ifugao behavior and alter centuries-old patterns of existence. Yet .lfugao perceptions of th~ Americans are _as positive as their memc;>ries of the Spanish are negative. · T-his study examines the development of this remarkable IfugaQ esteem for the American apos by looking at the Ifugao-American relationship thr.ough the eyes of th·e participants themselves.
I .
